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Intellectual
Property Rights: A
Hydra, a Minefield, a Recognition of Human AchievementA
little History There
is perhaps no subject of human enquiry that is as historically misunderstood as "Intellectual
Property Rights". When compared to most any other subject, except
perhaps religion, Intellectual Property has the distinction of
alternately having been more intensely overvalued and undervalued, admired and
despised, credited and blamed, praised and denigrated, respected and violated,
over- and under-regulated, than most any other human asset, in sum, generally
misrepresented to a degree unbestowed on most anything else . The level of
consideration people have had for the Rights to Intellectual Property has
generally tracked, with a time lag commensurate with their economic and
political relevance to mankind, the attention given to the property itself. In
effect, the attention given to Rights has followed a three-dimensional,
multi-phase fluctuation of intensity over time and space, virtually un-
unmatched by that given to most any other bundle of rights, guaranteed to
generate and perpetuate conundrums everywhere. This fluctuation
in mankind's attention is in sharp contrast to the gradual growth of its
interest in other pursuits such as commerce and technology. For
instance, technology, despite a few periods of apparent quiescence in its
development, has, over the millennia and in cultures the world over, sustained a
fairly steady growth, with few significant relapses, from the Stone Age to the
post industrial era we are entering today. Some may fantasize about earthly vestiges of monuments attributable to a
supposedly technologically advanced race, but there is no serious evidence of a
body of technology, centuries or aeons ago, remotely matching or surpassing today's. Commerce,
likewise, seems to have steadily advanced in complexity and sophistication, at
least over recorded history. Temporary slowdowns in Europe during the
post-Roman and pre-Renaissance eras are either inconclusively proven or not
significant enough to interrupt a centuries-long history of growth. Both
of these yardsticks, commerce and technology, are of course closely related and
integrated, as are other measures of human development, such as art and other
vehicles of self-expression, and all have in their wake generated territorial
concepts of rights. One might say that a claim of rights staked today in a
courtroom to a commercial or
technological advantage is neither categorically
different from nor less ferocious than the exclusivity sought with tooth and
claw by wild species to
carcasses of prey, territories marked by body fluids, or mates and offspring. The human species has found it useful to
enshrine these rights in laws and inveterately used documentation to perpetuate
their universality. It is no surprise Moses found it necessary to bring down
inscribed Tables from his divine encounter so the "chosen
people" might be able to verify the authenticity of the Word. Human
laws, with some notable exceptions, mostly dealt with man's relationship to
things tangible and, at least initially, portable objects about which a
"Thou shalt not Steal" could easily be understood. Notable
exceptions addressed societal imperatives such as not
killing, not coveting another's spouse, honoring one's elders and loving the One
who had the foresight to document all of these "shalt" and
"shalt not" in the first place. Laws against
killing and lesser offenses could, after all, all be subsumed under the
Law of the Talion, of biblical resonance, fundamentally institutionalized
revenge. In their simplicity, these laws did not need
a great deal of mental gymnastics to articulate or enforce. Laws relating to
person to person relationships could likewise fit within the confines of
personal or generational memory, but laws relating to personal property, passing
from generation to generation, from seller to buyer or from owner to thief and
later extended to real
property, had to be far more differentiating. The
imperative against theft was the one that was most likely to produce a
progeny of laws unequaled in any other sector of human behavior. Other property
laws followed, with longr lasting effect, as a myriad situations arising
from the holding of property, both personal and real, developed over the
centuries. In Roman times,
jurists were able to separate use from ownership. The "usufruct" was a
creation of the law, allowing one to enjoy the benefits of an estate owned by
another. In early English common law, a related though intellectually different
concept likewise allowed successive non-owners to enjoy most of the benefits of
occupancy, sometimes for their entire lives, leaving the owner to his
reversionary rights, to enjoy when such lives ended. Thus continued a
tradition of rights disconnected from physical possession or "seisin",
still in use today. As long
as the underlying property was tangible and readily held, the possession and
"seisin" of it were concepts of rights that peacekeepers could work
with, even when, as with seisin, the item might not actually be portable. It was
sufficient if the item could be identified as the work of human hands, or the
subject of human physical activity or control. The later intellectualization
of such rights - so that, to claim them, one needed not necessarily be in
actual possession and control of the item - marked a watershed in the
development of rights of ownership and may be thought of as the origin of many
new forms of ownership, disconnected from the strict physical grasp of the
claimant. From then on, the complexity of rights and their remedies for
their violation increased exponentially. For example, the reversion right of an owner to land he cannot occupy, because
someone else, e.g. a tenant, can, is called a "future interest", not a
tangible thing, but can be transferred for value, divided into many separate
strands, likewise intangible and valuable, over time and space, ad
infinitum. Historically, it may be viewed as the ancestor of the entire
law of trusts, a prime example of complexity by any yardstick. To be sure,
semantically, the right to anything can be said to be "intangible"
since one cannot "touch" any right, but in practical terms, a present
possessory right, for the holder, is a lot more "tangible" than that
of, say, an owner of only the reversionary right disconnected from possession. The concept of such
disconnected rights took a
great leap forward when the idea was born that property could be seen as a
bundle of rights, some of which could be separated from the bundle and
controlled, using today's parlance, "virtually" rather than
physically. It is to that idea that rights to things that were themselves
"intangible" can ascribe their lineage. Though,
originally, this intellectualization of rights applied only to land, it did not
take long to conceive of it as equally applicable to portable items, as long as
the underlying thing could be seen, touched, and identified, a physical
item susceptible of protection. Throughout the Middle Ages and the so-called
Modern Era, refinements of the concept were devised to handle an increasingly
sophisticated view of property rights, driven by the complexities of a widening
commerce, the fragmentation of medieval society and changes in the social
order. It took a while longer before a product of mental activity,
lacking a clear, tactile identity, could qualify for protection. That
was a major step forward. Previously, protection attached to the
right to a physically manifest and intrinsically useful object, say, land or an
ox. In that context, the physical manifestation of the mental activity, say, a book, has
no intrinsic value, save perhaps as a doorstop. People began to recognize that
it was is the thought behind the book that must be protected, not the paper and the ink.
Today, under
the right circumstances, many rights are recognized in the products of mental activity. They are now lumped under the heading of "intellectual
property rights". The
price to pay for extending rights to intangible things was added complexity and
uncertainty in a field that already had accumulated a wide diversity of problems
and solutions over the centuries.
(continued on page 5-2)
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